Could the ceasefire be a victim after Pakistan’s accusation against India? | India News
NEW DELHI: With Pakistani NSA Moeed Yusuf declaring that the June 23 explosion outside the home of terrorist leader Hafiz Mohammed Saeed in Lahore was the work of Indian intelligence agencies, it is clear that the ceasefire process nascent, which started with guns on the LOC going silent on February 25, may have run its course.
Yusuf told a TV station there would be no more behind-the-scenes talks with India, largely because the neighbor “ignored” Pakistan’s concerns and did not cancel the cancellation of section 370 in Jammu and Kashmir. He claimed that India had approached Pakistan for talks – “It was India who approached us. They (India) said they wanted to talk about all the controversial issues, including on the Cashmere.” He added that Pakistan had made clear its request to quash the August 2019 decision to resume talks.
While Yusuf indicated India’s alleged refusal to reinstate Section 370 was a reason to close the doors to any likely engagement, such consideration did not appear to be at work earlier when the army chief General Qamar Bajwa urged Pakistan to consider “geoeconomics†instead of just “geopolitics†and Imran Khan’s government has considered easing trade.
Yusuf’s statement on the explosion in the town of Johar conceals that it was the home of a UN-designated global terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and that its leader Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, supposedly in prison, was according to numerous reports at his residence at the time of the attack.
Indian officials see it as the beginning of a Pakistani narrative against India. It will be difficult for Pakistan to sell the story of a terrorist attack by India against the mastermind of the 11/26 attacks in Mumbai. Instead, they expect Pakistan to try to argue that India is responsible for creating internal instability.
Pakistan has been stunned by the pace of the Taliban’s advances in Afghanistan in recent weeks. Like others, they also expect a period of civil war in Afghanistan and fear that Pakistan may face a backlash, in terms of refugees, as well as fears that the anti-Pakistan TTP may link up with the Afghan Taliban.
Pakistan retains a strong hold over the Afghan Taliban leadership, especially the more vocal factions. But Islamabad-Rawalpindi fear that an angry Taliban under Pakistani rule could help other terrorist groups against Pakistan. This has the potential to overturn the whole idea of ​​“strategic depthâ€.
A narrative against India could be attempted for sympathy votes in the West. The Pakistani parliamentary committee on national security learned last week that the government wants a better relationship with the United States, without giving up its ties with China. Reports have indicated that Pakistani lawmakers have claimed they do not want to be seen as being in China’s pocket.
This could have implications for Pakistan-China relations, especially as the US-China rivalry deepens every day. Pakistan could achieve a more normal relationship with India, but this could have implications for its relationship with China. Or he could, as seems more likely, seek to paint India black in the West – reports suggest Pakistan could use a smart and coordinated media strategy and diaspora outreach to that end. Prime Minister Khan has been interviewed in Western media before and has written editorials as well.
Islamabad might feel that with Modi losing support from civil society and Western media, it might be an easier climb for Imran Khan and the Pakistani narrative.
Yusuf told a TV station there would be no more behind-the-scenes talks with India, largely because the neighbor “ignored” Pakistan’s concerns and did not cancel the cancellation of section 370 in Jammu and Kashmir. He claimed that India had approached Pakistan for talks – “It was India who approached us. They (India) said they wanted to talk about all the controversial issues, including on the Cashmere.” He added that Pakistan had made clear its request to quash the August 2019 decision to resume talks.
While Yusuf indicated India’s alleged refusal to reinstate Section 370 was a reason to close the doors to any likely engagement, such consideration did not appear to be at work earlier when the army chief General Qamar Bajwa urged Pakistan to consider “geoeconomics†instead of just “geopolitics†and Imran Khan’s government has considered easing trade.
Yusuf’s statement on the explosion in the town of Johar conceals that it was the home of a UN-designated global terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and that its leader Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, supposedly in prison, was according to numerous reports at his residence at the time of the attack.
Indian officials see it as the beginning of a Pakistani narrative against India. It will be difficult for Pakistan to sell the story of a terrorist attack by India against the mastermind of the 11/26 attacks in Mumbai. Instead, they expect Pakistan to try to argue that India is responsible for creating internal instability.
Pakistan has been stunned by the pace of the Taliban’s advances in Afghanistan in recent weeks. Like others, they also expect a period of civil war in Afghanistan and fear that Pakistan may face a backlash, in terms of refugees, as well as fears that the anti-Pakistan TTP may link up with the Afghan Taliban.
Pakistan retains a strong hold over the Afghan Taliban leadership, especially the more vocal factions. But Islamabad-Rawalpindi fear that an angry Taliban under Pakistani rule could help other terrorist groups against Pakistan. This has the potential to overturn the whole idea of ​​“strategic depthâ€.
A narrative against India could be attempted for sympathy votes in the West. The Pakistani parliamentary committee on national security learned last week that the government wants a better relationship with the United States, without giving up its ties with China. Reports have indicated that Pakistani lawmakers have claimed they do not want to be seen as being in China’s pocket.
This could have implications for Pakistan-China relations, especially as the US-China rivalry deepens every day. Pakistan could achieve a more normal relationship with India, but this could have implications for its relationship with China. Or he could, as seems more likely, seek to paint India black in the West – reports suggest Pakistan could use a smart and coordinated media strategy and diaspora outreach to that end. Prime Minister Khan has been interviewed in Western media before and has written editorials as well.
Islamabad might feel that with Modi losing support from civil society and Western media, it might be an easier climb for Imran Khan and the Pakistani narrative.